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Targeted Drug Donations: A Necessary Evil in
Need of a Global Harness and a Possible Cure
for TRIPS Shortcomings
GABRIELLA TZENEVA*
ABSTRACT
This Note explores the economic and social factors that drive
multinational pharmaceutical companies to donate drugs to developing
countries and evaluates the effectiveness of such donations in combating
medicine shortages. The Note poses that such donations provide
necessary economic incentives to drug companies and help curb high
medical prices in developed nations while being an essential tool for
ameliorating intellectual property requirements imposed by TRIPS. The
Note proposes two solutions to further incorporate donations in access to
medicine relief efforts and advocates increased international cooperation
in the practice.
INTRODUCTION
It is no secret that the world is confronted with a global health care
crisis that pervades nations to varying degrees depending on their
economic status and social structure. Yet, our society has somehow
grown numb to the numbers. Currently, a third of the world's
population lacks access to vital medicine that could prevent millions of
excruciating deaths each year.' In developing countries, children are
dying of preventable diseases that could be cured with appropriate
* Articles Editor, Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies; J.D. 2014, Indiana
University Maurer School of Law. I would like to thank my friends and family for their
support and Professor Phil Purcell for his advice and assistance.
1. Alain Guilloux & Suerie Moon, Hidden Price Tags: Disease-Specific Drug
Donations: Costs and Alternatives 189 (Feb. 1, 2001) (unpublished working paper),
available at http://www.deolhonaspatentes.org.br/medialfile/publicacoes/hiddenpricetags
.pdf.
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treatment.2 But is that shocking? Or have we resolved to accept such
conditions as an insoluble fact of life? At home, the United States is
faced with rising health care costs, and if the struggle over the passage
of the Affordable Health Care Act is any indication,3 achieving
affordable access to health care remains on the forefront of the national
health crisis. Considering the importance of a worldwide effort to
improve access to essential medicines, the practice of pharmaceutical
donations, what drives them, and how they can be best harnessed
warrants further attention.
Drug donations have been historically controversial due to the
largely decentralized nature of the process and the variety of donations
that currently exist. From "inventory dumping" to "corporate welfare,"4
the motives of drug companies' philanthropic efforts have been closely
scrutinized since the beginning of the practice. Many inappropriate
donations have been dubbed "drug dumping"5 and have undoubtedly
had a devastating impact on recipient countries left to deal with the
costly disposal of unsuitable and sometimes expired products.6
Attempting to "improve the quality of medicine donations" and ensure
effectiveness,7 in 1996 the World Health Organization (WHO), in
conjunction with other international agencies, issued its first set of
advisory guidelines,8 which have since had arguable success.9 It is worth
noting, however, that the cause of most inappropriate donations has not
been proven to be corporate misfeasance.' 0 A combination of factors,
including the lack of communication between donors and receivers, the
over- or underestimation of medical needs, and the lack of a formalized
2. See Graham Dutfield, Delivering Drugs to the Poor: Will the TRIPS Amendment
Help?, 34 AM. J. L. & MED. 107, 107 (2008).
3. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119
(2010), amended by Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010, Pub. L. No.
111-152, 124 Stat. 1029 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
4. Glenna Crooks, Drug Donations: Protecting Industry Philanthropy, PHARMACEUTICAL
EXECUTIVE, Aug. 1998.
5. See David Szostak, Book Note, Global Pharmaceutical Industry: Ensuring Profits
at the Expense of Public Health, 13 DEPAuL J. HEALTH CARE L. 103, 114-15 (2010).
6. See Philippe Autier et al., Drug Donations in Post-Emergency Situations, WORLD
BANK HEALTH, NUTRITION & POPULATION DISCUsSION PAPER SERIES 1 (June 2002),
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/HEALTHNUTRITIONANDPOPULATION/Resources/2
81627-1095698140167/Nassery-DrugDonation-whole.pdf.
7. WORLD HEALTH ORG., GUIDELINES FOR MEDICINE DONATIONS 3 (3d ed. 2011),
available at http://whqlibdoc.who.int/publications/2011/9789241501989_eng.pdf [hereinafter
WHO GUIDELINES].
8. Id.
9. See Autier et al., supra note 6, at 22; Radha Asher et al., First-Year Experiences with
the Interagency Guidelines for Drug Donations, WORLD HEALTH ORG. (2000), http://apps.
who.int/medicinedocs/en/d/Jwhozip50e/7.htmI [hereinafter WHO Guidelines Evaluation].
10. See Crooks, supra note 4.
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process, have been established as the leading causes of failed donation
efforts." In addition, the majority of improper donations involve aid in
response to international crisis situations, including events similar to
the Haiti earthquake or the South Asian tsunami,12 not donations for
developmental purposes, which are the focus of this Note.
Although donations as a whole have gained a bad reputation and
pharmaceutical companies have largely taken the brunt of criticism due
to the nature of the donated products and lack of accountability
mechanisms,' 3 targeted donations for long-term developmental purposes
have had significant success in combating a number of endemics.14
Despite shortcomings regarding the quality and effectiveness of
donations,' 5 which all interested stakeholders should address with
concerted effort, drug donations play a number of important roles and
are therefore a necessary evil that should be properly regulated but not
discouraged.
In particular, the potential of targeted donations to remedy the
shortage of medicine as a result of the Trade Related Aspects of
Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS)16 agreement and the Doha
Declaration' 7 is significant in light of balancing the importance of
protecting pharmaceutical intellectual property rights while taking into
account the ability of developing countries to meet international
standards without jeopardizing their medical needs. To that end, this
Note presents an expos6 of the economic and social factors behind
corporate donations and considers how these incentives can be best
employed to ameliorate the shortage of medicine that currently exists in
developing countries. Part I provides an overview of the pharmaceutical
industry and discusses the social and economic factors motivating drug
companies to donate. Part II briefly outlines the nature of targeted
development donations by discussing existing programs and their
11. See WHO GUIDELINES, supra note 7, at 6-7.
12. See Autier et al., supra note 6, at 3.
13. See generally Crooks, supra note 4 (stating that pharmaceutical companies are
often blamed for failed donations) (also stating that many donations cannot be traced to
the original donors due to lack of formality and proper procedures between all the actors
involved in the process; and that as a result, the easiest scapegoats in cases of impropriety
are manufacturers, whose information is imprinted on the drug, although they are not the
original source of the donation and have limited control over its quality once it leaves their
possession).
14. See infra Part II.
15. See WHO Guidelines Evaluation, supra note 9.
16. See Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15,
1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, 1869
U.N.T.S. 299 [hereinafter TRIPS Agreement].
17. See World Trade Organization, Ministerial Declaration of 14 November 2001,
WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1, 41 I.L.M. 746 (2002) [hereinafter Doha Declaration].
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success. Part III summarizes the post-TRIPS environment and points to
key aspects of the agreement that make access to medicines difficult for
developing countries despite a compulsory licensing exception. Finally,
Part IV outlines recommendations on how targeted donations can
remedy the access problem, including the use of a voucher system as a
complement to tax deductions.
I. BEHIND DRUG DONATIONS FROM A CORPORATE PERSPECTIVE: WHY
DONATE?
To further appreciate the importance and potential benefits of drug
donations, it is essential to consider the driving factors behind them.
Reasons for pharmaceutical donations are often oversimplified to
accusations of "corporate welfare,"' 8 but realistically the prospects of a
tax break do not fully capture the environment in which pharmaceutical
companies operate and why financial incentives are critical in
promoting the practice.' 9 Considering the overwhelming public and
academic backlash against donations, 20 which often ends in publicity
nightmares for pharmaceutical companies, 2 1 it is striking that such
programs have continued to grow in the past decade. 22 This growth
suggests that both economic and altruistic motives drive donations and,
therefore, considering the efficacy of existing programs to ameliorate
access to medicine, it is worth taking a more objective view toward such
philanthropic initiatives.
A. The Impact of Generics and Insurance Companies on the Need to
Donate
Although the precise impact of generics and insurance companies on
brand-name drug companies is disputed,23 most experts agree that
18. Crooks, supra note 4. Corporate welfare refers to government subsidies for
corporate entities. The term is usually used in a derogatory fashion to compare corporate
subsidies to welfare payments for the poor.
19. See id. (noting that the U.S. encourages private philanthropy through its tax code
as a matter of public policy). It is important to point out that the tax break this Note
refers to only applies to U.S.-based companies under the American Corporate Income Tax
system.
20. See generally Richard Aplenc et al., Letters to the Editor, Inappropriate Drug-
Donation Practices in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 338 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1472, 1472-74
(1998).
21. See Crooks, supra note 4.
22. Id.
23. See generally U.S. CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, EFFECTS OF USING GENERIC DRUGS ON
MEDICARE'S PRESCRIPTION DRUG SPENDING (2010) [hereinafter EFFECTS OF GENERICS],
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competition with generic producers and insurance companies' overall
preference for generics inevitably exerts pressure on profit margins.24
Based on that premise, donations help recuperate losses and research
and development costs that are forfeited when generic producers detract
market share away from brand-name drugs after a lengthy and
expensive patent process, 25 and insurance companies, as well as
government programs, use generic substitution to curb costs. 26
Generic drugs are "chemically equivalent versions of brand-name
drugs that can be approved under an abbreviated regulatory process." 27
The abbreviated process refers to a section of the Hatch-Waxman
Amendments of the Drug Price Competition and Patent Term
Restoration Act of 1984.28 Under section 101 of the Act (amending
section 505 of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act),29 an
abbreviated new drug application (ANDA) approval process allows
generic versions of previously approved brand-name drugs to enter the
market, bypass the "costly clinical trials" originally conducted,30 and
gain approval as long as the generic "contains the same active
ingredient as the brand-name version" and "provides very similar
concentrations of the drug in the blood."31 In addition, an ANDA
applicant under paragraph IV of 502()32 may be protected from
competition from subsequent generic versions for 180 days after either
the first marketing of the original generic or a court decision holding the
brand name patent to be invalid or not infringed. 33 This protection for
available at http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/ftpdocs/118xx/docl1838/09-15-pr
escriptiondrugs.pdf.
24. See id. at 9-10.
25. See id.
26. Id. at 7, 13 (referring to Medicare programs using generic substitution and explaining
that "[i]n 2007, about 65 percent of Part D prescriptions were filled with generic drugs, but
those prescriptions accounted for about one-quarter of total prescription drug costs").
27. Id. at 8.
28. Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-
417, 98 Stat. 1585 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 21 U.S.C. and 35 U.S.C.)
[hereinafter Drug Price Competition Act] (the Hatch-Waxman Amendments).
29. Id. § 101.
30. EFFECTS OF GENERICS, supra note 23, at 8.
31. Id.
32. An ANDA applicant must include in the ANDA a patent certification as described
in section 505(j)(2)(A)(vii) of the Act. The certification must make one of the following
statements: (1) no patent information on the drug product that is the subject of the ANDA
has been submitted to FDA; (II) such patent has expired; (III) the date on which such
patent will expire; or (TV) such patent is invalid or will not be infringed by the
manufacture, use, or sale of the drug product. Drug Price Competition Act § 101.
33. U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. CTR. FOR DRUG
EVALUATION & RESEARCH, GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY: 180-DAY GENERIC DRUG ExCLUSIVITY
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generic producers is commonly referred to as "180-day exclusivity."34
Also, the overall impact of generics is to either increase or decrease the
price of the brand-name drug,35 with either option adversely affecting
the profit margins of brand name producers. Because generic producers
can afford to price their products on average at 75% off the price of
brand-name drugs, 36 they are able to "capture a large share of the
market."37 In 2010, generics "captured 80% of a brand's volume within
six months of patent loss."38
Moreover, research has demonstrated that generic entry lowers
total spending on the drug for both generic and nongeneric versions due
to a decrease in the average price of the drug. 39 Therefore, although
generics are arguably necessary to offset high prices and total medical
spending,40 it is important to acknowledge the negative effect they have
on profits of nongeneric producers who are forced to bear the costs of
research and development and hope to make up for such costs before
competition with generics ensues.
The aforementioned scenario is repeated when insurance companies
and government programs exercise a preference for generic products.41
The process of generic substitution involves the "switching [of] a
prescription from a brand-name drug to a less expensive chemically
equivalent generic drug."42 Substitution is possible because once a drug
is available in a generic version, pharmacists can dispense either the
generic or the brand-name drug,43 and generics are often used by health
insurers to lower their spending on prescription drugs.44 Although some
regulations require pharmacists to get consent from patients or at least
inform them of the substitution, 45 health insurers receive help from
pharmacies that have an interest in boasting lower prices by supplying
UNDER THE HATCH-WAXMAN AMENDMENTS TO THE FEDERAL FOOD, DRUG, AND COSMETIC
ACT 2 (1998) [hereinafter FDA GUIDANCE].
34. Id.
35. EFFECTS OF GENERICS, supra note 23, at 10.
36. Id. at 8-9.
37. Id. at 10.
38. James Brumley, What's the Real Impact of Generic Drugs?, INVESTORPLACE (June
28, 2012, 11:57 AM), http://investorplace.com/2012/06/whats-the-real-impact-of-generic-dr
ugs/.
39. See EFFECTS OF GENERICS, supra note 23, at 11.
40. See Brumley, supra note 38 (explaining that in 2010, "generic drugs saved the U.S.
more than $158 billion in prescription costs").
41. See generally EFFECTS OF GENERICS, supra note 23.
42. Id. at 1.
43. Id. at 9.
44. Id.
45. Id.
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generics.4 6 In 2011, generics made up a staggering 80% of prescription
drug sales in the United States, reflecting an increase from previous
years.47
In addition, insurance companies are allowed to promote generic
substitution by using a list of covered drugs on their insurance policies,
which may directly exclude some brand names from coverage or charge
a lower copayment for generics. 48 Unfortunately, substitution, although
helpful to consumers' pocketbooks, carries risks in cases when
physicians specifically prohibit the use of generics, such as in the
treatment of epilepsy. 49 Overall, it appears that generics and insurance
companies have an effect on the pharmaceutical industry, although the
precise losses are difficult to measure and are certainty debatable.
B. Economic Incentives: Tax Deductions
Considering the environment in which pharmaceutical companies
operate, it is understandable that companies take advantage of tax
breaks for certain qualifying charitable donations in order to offset
losses.5 0 The tax incentive refers to a tax deduction under Internal
Revenue Code Section 170(e)(3). 51 Commonly referred to as an
"enhanced deduction," the Tax Code allows companies to benefit from an
essentially public subsidy if certain conditions are met.5 2 To qualify for
the tax break, the donated product must be "used . . . solely for the care
of the ill, the needy, or infants"53 and must comply with FDA
regulations. 54 The drug must also be "sellable" or have a "fair market
value."5 5 Due to that requirement, drug samples or expiring/expired
drugs would not qualify for the deduction because there is no readily
available market-no hospital or facility would normally buy such
drugs.5 6 Although the Tax Code does not currently require compliance
46. Id.
47. Brumley, supra note 38.
48. EFFECTS OF GENERICS, supra note 23, at 9.
49. See id, at 8.
,50. See, e.g., James B. Russo, Drug Donations: What Drives Them? Should They Be
Driven? Policy Implications of A Debated Practice, PARTNERSHIP FOR QUALITY MED.
DONATIONS 2 (Jan. 6, 2008) http://www.pqmd.org/assets/PDFs/drug-donations-policy-imp
lications-of a.debated-practice.pdf.
51. See I.R.C. § 170(e)(3) (2006).
52. See id. See also Guilloux & Moon, supra note 1, at 196 (describing enhanced
deductions under the I.R.C.).
53. I.R.C. § 170(e)(3)(A)(i).
54. Id. § 170(e)(3)(A)(iv).
55. Russo, supra note 50, at 1.
56. Id.
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with WHO guidelines,57 despite proposals for same,58 several major
pharmaceutical companies, including Merck,59 have pledged to follow
the guidelines and have procedures in place to ensure the quality of
donations 60 In addition, while deductions "are generally limited to the
cost or basis of the goods,"61 under Section 170(e)(3), the enhanced
deduction allows a drug company to deduct the lesser of either the cost
basis plus half the difference between cost of the good and fair market
value (FMV) or twice the cost basis. 62 The cost of goods does not
normally include research and development expenses or marketing and
administrative costs;63 however, because many 'costs of goods' costs are
fixed" and economies of scale are generally available,64 the tax deduction
may be higher than the marginal cost of producing the donated drugs.65
Theoretically, under these guidelines, a company can lower its
taxable income by up to 70% of the cost of producing the donation,
considering that the maximum corporate rate in the United States is
currently 35%.66 In such an instance, the cost to taxpayers may range
anywhere between "10.5% to 21% of the FMV of the donated product."67
However, because "charitable contributions are capped at 10% of a
company's taxable income,"65  corporations, especially large
pharmaceutical companies such as Merck or GlaxoSmithKline, are
unlikely to get a full tax reduction.69
57. See generally WHO GUIDELINES, supra note 7 (explaining current WHO Guidelines
for medicine donations).
58. Russo, supra note 50, at 2-3. Congressman Lloyd Doggett (D, TX) proposed to
disallow the charitable tax deduction on donations unless they comply with WHO
guidelines. Id. Upon proposal of the bill, a request was made to the Congressional
Accounting Office (GAO) to estimate the savings the bill would bring to the US Treasury
but, according to GAO, such estimates were not feasible due to the relatively small
number of firms that take advantage of the tax deduction. Id.
59. MERCK, PUBLIC POLICY STATEMENT: CHARITABLE PRODUCT DONATIONS (2010),
available at http://www.merck.comlabout/views-and-positions/charitable-product-donation
s.pdf.
60. See, e.g., id.; Crooks, supra note 4.
61. Guilloux & Moon, supra note 1, at 196.
62. The FMV refers to the selling price of the drug in the United States. Id.
63. See id. at 195; Manon Ress, Tax Deductions for Pharmaceutical Drug Donations,
CONSUMER PROJECT ON TECH. (June 29, 2000), http://www.cptech.org/ip/healthlecon/tax
code.html.
64. Ress, supra note 63.
65. Id.
66. Guilloux & Moon, supra note 1, at 196 (stating that the 70% is calculated by
multiplying the maximum tax rate of 35% by twice the cost basis); see generally I.R.C. §
170(e)(3) (2006).
67. Guilloux & Moon, supra note 1, at 197.
68. Id.
69. See id.
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While accusations that "U.S. tax laws make it possible to make
money out of worthless drugs" 70 sound catchy, especially in light of prior
incidents with inappropriate donations,7 ' the above analysis of the Tax
Code suggests otherwise. The donation may not include so-called
worthless drugS72 if a fair market value has to be assigned to earn tax
credit. Such criticisms likely misconstrue issues regarding the
appropriateness of donations, and the motives behind them, without
actual evidence to the contrary. 73 Moreover, while it would be nearly
impossible to ascertain the motivations of individual drug companies at
any given time, it would appear that if the criticisms were true and tax
incentives indeed allow companies to "make money" from donations, 74
far more drugs would be donated to cash in on tax deductions.7 5 Also,
while it is possible that some drug companies have donated for venal
reasons in the past, it is difficult to explain, from an economic
standpoint, why drug companies collaborate and devote additional
resources such as managerial assistance76 if their main goal is financial
gain.77 Critics who shun drug donations because of tax incentives also
appear to have an unrealistic expectation that the industry should be
somehow expected to "incur losses ad infinitum," 78 which would place it
at a "significant disadvantage in its ability to compete for capital and
other resources with other industries."7 9
Overall, the debate regarding the significance of tax incentives
detracts from the main issue of whether donations can be helpful in
improving access to medicines in the developing world, and if so, what
70. Russo, supra note 50, at 1.
71. See id.
72. Id.
73. See generally WHO Guidelines Evaluation, supra note 10 (pointing out that
problems with donations arise out of miscommunication and problems with customs
clearance).
74. Russo, supra note 50, at 2 (emphasis omitted).
75. Id. This assumption is further based on GAO's inability to calculate the impact of
tax deductions on the U.S. treasury. See id. at 2-3.
76. See id. at 3 (referring to pharmaceutical companies offering assistance for
management and processing of drug donations, as well as expanding plant capacity to
facilitate donations).
77. Promotion of company image and goodwill partly contradicts this argument, but
given the overwhelmingly negative publicity of drug donations, companies are conceivably
taking a huge public relations risk by participating in such programs. See generally
Crooks, supra note 4.
78. Bryan Mercurio, Resolving the Public Health Crisis in the Developing World:
Problems and Barriers of Access to Essential Medicines, 5 Nw. J. INT'L HUM. RTS. 1, 27
(2006).
79. Id.
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can be done to promote the practice rather than curb a financial
motivator.s0
C. Social Incentives: Company Image, Employee Morale
Although difficult to measure and predict, social incentives such as
boosting employee morale, improving company image, and increasing
good will certainly play a role in informing companies' decision to
donate. In fact, the increased popularity of practices such as socially
responsible investing8' and cause-related marketing82 suggests that
businesses are progressively incorporating philanthropy because "social
responsibility is viewed as an investment by corporations."83 In that
sense, drug donation programs can attract investors looking to "catalyze
positive change in society at large,"84 enhance corporate image, and even
thwart negative publicity.85 Evidence for the effect of indirect economic
incentives can be gleaned from the tremendous success of Merck's
Mectizan Donation Program,86 which has received a number of
recognition awards from international organizations that invariably
have improved Merck's image as a "good corporate citizen."87
Successful philanthropic donations serve the additional purpose of
improving employee morale by making employees feel they are a part of
a significant global effort to further a noble cause.88 Similarly, public
perceptions of a company are, in part, dependent on the causes it
supports and the extent of its commitment to altruistic deeds beyond-
80. From a social perspective, the tax deduction can also be considered a symbol of the
American public's altruism. By offering to forfeit the tax revenue that would otherwise be
collected, the American public is making a statement that it wishes to promote drug
donations and aid the developing world, which in itself is worth remembering.
81. Steve Schueth, Socially Responsible Investing in the United States, 43 J. Bus.
ETHICS 189, 190 (2003) (defining socially responsible investing (SRI) as "the process of
integrating personal values and societal concerns into investment decision-making")
(emphasis omitted).
82. P. Rajan Varadarajan & Anil Menon, Cause-Related Marketing: A Coalignment of
Marketing Strategy and Corporate Philanthropy, 52 J. MKTG. 58, 59 (1988) (describing
cause related marketing as a program that "strives to ... improve corporate performance
and help worthy causes . . . by linking fund raising for the benefit of a cause to the
purchase of the firm's products and/or services").
83. Id. at 58.
84. Schueth, supra note 81, at 190.
85. Varadarajan & Menon, supra note 82, at 60.
86. See infra Part II.A.
87. PHILIP E. COYNE & DAVID W. BERK, WORLD HEALTH ORG., THE MECTIZAN
(IVERMEcTIN) DONATION PROGRAM FOR RIVERBLINDNESS AS A PARADIGM FOR
PHARMACEUTICAL INDuSTRY DONATION PROGRAMS 16 (2001), available at http://apps.who.
int/medicinedocs/documents/sl7517en/sl7517en.pdf.
88. Id.
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profits. Consequently, donations carry tremendous potential to affect,
both positively and negatively,8 9 a company's public image and the good
will associated with it.
II. WHAT ARE TARGETED, NONEMERGENCY DONATIONS AND
Do THEY WORK?
Although lacking any scientific definition, for the purpose of this
Note, targeted, nonemergency donations refer to formal donation
programs between private and public parties organized to treat a
specific, targeted disease or aid in the development of a public health
care system or an aspect of it.9o
Targeted development donations differ from donations in response
to emergency situations in that they involve collaboration between the
parties and more extensive planning.9 1 In fact, to maximize the positive
impact of such donations, "effective communication and negotiation
between donors and recipients" is essential for ensuring that the needs
of recipients are properly met,92 as suggested by the WHO Guidelines.
However, maintaining such open channels of communication is not
always an easy task, even with targeted donation programs, because
"donations often flow across several layers of organizations, over
language and cultural barriers, and through differentials of power and
poverty."93 Even so, existing targeted donation programs have made
great strides in alleviating medical treatment for a number of endemics
despite the fact that "data measuring actual improvements to access as
a result of donation programs are scarce" due to the relative novelty of
"major disease-specific drug donations."94 Nevertheless, the following
subsection presents what limited statistics are available about major
existing programs and considers the benefits as well as pitfalls of such
initiatives.
89. See generally Crooks, supra note 4 (illustrating the effect of failed donation efforts
on the image of pharmaceutical companies).
90. This definition most closely reflects product-specific donation programs as defined
in COYNE & BERK, supra note 87, at 7. However, it attempts to expand the definition of
such non-emergency donations by including drugs outside the current scope and in
particular those whose access is currently impeded by TRIPS patent restrictions. See infra
Part III.
91. For examples of emergency donations, see generally Autier et al., supra note 6;
Aplenc et al., supra note 20.
92. Autier et al., supra note 6, at 1.
93. Id.
94. Guilloux & Moon, supra note 1, at 191.
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A. Existing Programs
Dating back to 1987, the forerunner of all targeted donation
programs is Merck's donation of Mectizan for treatment of
onchocerciasis, also known as river blindness. The company pledged to
"donate the drug to all who need it for as long as needed."95 Since then,
Merck has provided "well over 100 million treatments . . . for
onchocerciasis." 96 The treatments spare individuals with advanced
onchocerciasis from "inexorable progression to blindness,"97 as well as
relieve milder, dermatologic symptoms of the disease.98 The Mectizan
initiative is a public health-oriented program in that "the donated
product is administered to an entire community,"99 and efforts are made
to limit further transmission of the disease.100 The program benefits
"[clommunities otherwise lacking access to appropriate
pharmaceuticals."10 In the absence of Merck's initiative, individuals in
countries with the river blindness endemic would "totally lack access to
an effective and safe . . . drug."102 In addition, Merck's Mectizan
program does not merely deliver a drug but has effectively established
"the rudimentary basis for a functioning health care system" due to
Merck's involvement with the entire community and the elaborate
network of parties involved.103 To ensure oversight and proper
administration of the program, the Mectizan initiative is run by an
external entity, the Mectizan Donation Program, which is separate from
Merck as a corporation. 104 Notably, although Mectizan is donated, the
company is still responsible for "adverse drug effects." 05 It is also
subject to investigation by drug regulatory authorities such as the Food
and Drug Administration (FDA).106 As one can imagine, such liability
adds additional "drain on company profits" and requires maximum
efficiency and use of tax benefits to avoid impinging on the tolerance of
major stakeholders. 0 7
95. COYNE & BERK, supra note 87, at 11.
96. David Henry & Joel Lexchin, The Pharmaceutical Industry as a Medicines
Provider, 360 LANCET 1590, 1590 (2002).
97. COYNE & BERK, supra note 87, at 9.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 8.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 15 (emphasis omitted).
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 13.
105. Id. at 12.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 18.
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Another major pharmaceutical company, Britain's GlaxoSmithKline
(GSK) has a similar donation program and has pledged to "supply all
the albendazole needed to eliminate lymphatic filariasis worldwide by
2020."108 From 2000 to 2010, GSK donated over 2.6 billion treatments to
fifty-eight countries,1 09 which over a period of seven years has had an
economic impact of $24 billion, 110 costing the company £12 million a
year."' Otherwise, the program is very similar in structure and function
to the Mectizan initiative, except that GSK does not receive a tax break
for its donations. 112
On the other hand, Pfizer has pledged to a somewhat more limited
donation program by offering to supply fluconazole for the treatment of
cryptococcal meningitis (an AIDS-related infection) only in South Africa,
without extending the offer to other sub-Saharan countries.113 Although
the precise reasons for the restriction are unclear, Pfizer has faced
criticism regarding the limitation.114 On one hand, such criticisms are
valid in that they highlight inadequacies of donations to meet all need.
On the other hand, it is unfair for companies like Pfizer to take the
brunt of the criticism even when they appear to be genuinely interested
in helping. For example, while the limited donation of fluconazole has
garnered most of the negative attention, the company has also pledged
to provide an unlimited supply of Diflucan, an antifungal AIDS
medicine, in all fifty AIDS-ridden countries identified by the United
Nations. 115 This negative publicity highlights the disapproving attitude
of critics for whom every philanthropic gesture by the corporate world is
seen through a cynical lens and found to be inadequate unless
completely altruistic-a near impossibility given realities of fiscal
sustainability and warranted self-interest.
108. GlaxoSmithKline, UNITING TO COMBAT NTDs, http://www.unitingtocombatntds.org/
endorsement/glaxosmithkline (last visited Nov. 14, 2013).
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Rachel Cooper, GlaxoSmithKline Ups Albendazole Worm Drug Donation,
TELEGRAPH (Oct. 14, 2010, 6:30 AM), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/newsbysector/
pharmaceuticalsandchemicals/8062194/GlaxoSmithKline-ups-albendazole-worm-drug-
donation.html.
112. Id.
113. Henry & Lexchin, supra note 96, at 1590.
114. Id.
115. Pfizer to Donate Anti-fungal AIDS Drugs, CNN.coM (June 6, 2001, 3:32 PM),
http://edition.cnn.com/2001/HEALTH/conditions/06/06/pfizer.un/.
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B. Potential Concerns with Targeted Donations
While all four of the above-mentioned programs appear successful
and helpful on their face, valid questions exist regarding the long-term
impact of such donations. Given the long-term goals of such initiatives,
final success can only be ascertained if "the effort is sustained until the
job is done."116 In addition, many experts express concern that the
greatest danger associated with long-term donation programs is the risk
of dependency whereby developing countries fail to improve internal
capacity to provide the needed medicines because they rely on the
promise of ad infinitum support.117 Moreover, there are sustainability
issues related to using targeted donations as a long-term solution to the
access to medicine problems.s18 Those sustainability concerns are
further exacerbated by the fact that donations can feasibly fill only a
fraction of all the existing medical need.119 Certainly, such concerns are
valid, and this Note does not suggest that donations are a long-term
solution or the sole solution to the problem. Rather, this Note argues
that donations should be encouraged as a complimentary solution.
Some argue that administration and management of donations in
the recipient countries divert "scarce human resources [away] from
existing health structures" and present additional burdens.120 The
storage and distribution of supplies often prove difficult for developing
countries that lack the infrastructure and resources to handle them and
may "give rise to numerous problems . . . ranging from technical failure
to staff corruption." 21 To ameliorate technical problems, building
additional structures might be necessary to process and utilize
donations even if it costs recipients some of their already limited funds.
However, it appears that any possible cost of construction would be
outweighed by the benefit of the donations. Considering the extensive
planning that goes into long-term, targeted programs, recipient
countries can refuse the donation if it places an insurmountable burden
on their existing structures, or they can find alternative ways to fund
the additional administrative work. Some also argue that, because
donations enter the drug markets of developing countries, they may be
harmful to the developing countries' generic industries and act as unfair
116. COYNE & BERK, supra note 87, at 19.
117. See Guilloux & Moon, supra note 1, at 191..
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 192.
121. FREDERICK M. ABBO1T & GRAHAM DUKES, GLOBAL PHARMACEUTICAL POLIcY 125
(2009).
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competition. 122 This argument is based on the idea that generic products
cannot realistically compete with free medicines, and, therefore,
donations infringe on the generic industries of developing countries that
some feel should be protected.123
Generally, the above-listed concerns are important to keep in mind
when planning and evaluating potential drug donation programs as
they can impede their success. However, these issues are only a very
broad overview of potential problems with targeted donations and are
by no means an exclusive list.124
III. THE POST-TRIPS ENVIRONMENT AND ROAD BLOCKS TO ACCESS
Since the original TRIPS Agreement, there has been heated debate
regarding the nature, flaws, and potential impact of, arguably, the first
"harmonized approach" members of the World Trade Organization
(WTO) have taken to protect the rights of intellectual property rights
holders,125 including medical patent owners. 126 This section does not
seek to refute or comment on any existing literature but rather to
provide a brief overview of the significance of TRIPS in relation to the
access to medicine crisis in the developing world and, specifically, the
potential for targeted drug donations to ameliorate existing TRIPS-
related problems.
In broadest terms, the purpose of the TRIPS Agreement is to allow
"[t]he protection and enforcement of intellectual property rights"
between states to encourage "technological innovation and . . . the
transfer and dissemination of technology."127 Although theoretically
sound, TRIPS commentators have pointed out that such stringent
protection has largely been to the benefit of pharmaceutical companies
in developed nations, while limiting generic producers in developing
countries from manufacturing patented drugs.128 Skeptics have argued
that "strong patent rights serve principally to transfer income from poor
countries to rich . . . [and] the social costs of patent[s] . . . outweigh any
122. Guilloux & Moon, supra note 1, at 192. See infra Part III, for further discussion of
this argument.
123. Guilloux & Moon, supra note 1, at 192.
124. See generally Guilloux & Moon, supra note 1, for additional concerns with donation
programs.
125. Mercurio, supra note 78, at 4.
126. Id. Particularly, Article 27 of TRIPS extends patent protection to pharmaceuticals.
See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 16, art. 27.
127. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 16, art. 7.
128. See Marla L. Mellino, The TRIPS Agreement: Helping or Hurting Least Developed
Countries' Access to Essential Pharmaceuticals?, 20 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA &
ENT. L.J. 1349, 1353 (2010).
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potential benefits."129 Supporters of TRIPS and international patent
rights, on the other hand, argue "the protection . .. is in the interest of
the developing world,"130 because it "may provide an incentive for firms
to invest in research and development."131 However, this prognosis has
not been substantiated by concrete evidence to date, probably because of
the number of extensions for TRIPS enforcement that have been given
to developing and least-developed countries.1 32 Critics have also pointed
out that even with such lengthy implementation periods and exceptions
built into TRIPS, the enforcement of TRIPS still results in gains for
developed nations.133 The exceptions were formally clarified during the
Fourth Ministerial Conference, held in Doha, Qatar in 2001, where
Member States adopted a Declaration on TRIPS and Public Health (the
Doha Declaration),134 which has been considered the first significant
victory for developing countries in the pharmaceutical field. 35
Paragraphs one through five of the Declaration specifically outline
the flexibilities in the Agreement intended to cater to the developing
world.13 6 Paragraph four states that promoting access to medicines is a
legitimate basis to allow developing countries to "enact exceptions to
patent protection in their domestic legislation."'3 7 This is related to the
original TRIPS Article 31(f), which outlines the conditions allowing
developing countries to issue "compulsory licenses" to domestic
manufacturers in cases of emergency.138 However, although aimed to aid
developing countries, the article, in effect, prevents a country "from
benefiting from the compulsory licensing provision if it does not have
sufficient manufacturing capabilities because, in practice, the provision
limits the licensee's ability to export medicines to a country with public
health needs, thereby preventing countries with insufficient or no
manufacturing capabilities from taking advantage of the provision."139
129. Thomas F. Cotter, Market Fundamentalism and the TRIPS Agreement, 22
CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 307, 313 (2004).
130. Id.
131. Id. at 314.
132. See id. at 312-14.
133. See, e.g., Keith E. Maskus, Intellectual Property Rights and Economic Development,
32 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 471, 488 (2000) (pointing out that although TRIPS may act as
a catalyst for R&D of endemic diseases in the future by increasing pharmaceutical profits
that might get reinvested, it is unlikely that it will improve access to patented medicine in
impoverished countries); Mellino, supra note 128, at 1353.
134. Doha Declaration, supra note 17.
135. See, e.g., Bryan C. Mercurio, TRIPS, Patents, and Access to Life-Saving Drugs in
the Developing World, 8 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 211, 228 (2004).
136. See Doha Declaration, supra note 17, 1 1-5.
137. Mercurio, supra note 78, at 6.
138. Id. at 7.
139. Id.
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To remedy that, a subsequent agreement, the Implementation of
Paragraph six of the Doha Declaration on TRIPS Agreement and Public
Health (Implementation Agreement),140 was reached, which "allows
nations with insufficient or no manufacturing capabilities to override
intellectual property protection and import generic copies of patented
drugs to combat public health crises."141 Still, "in order to be TRIPS
compliant, the importing Member must abide by several procedural
steps," such as notifying the TRIPS Council of the "names and expected
quantities of the products needed." 42
Unfortunately, even with the listed exceptions and flexibilities that
the international community has afforded to developing countries in
situations of national emergency, the practical result of TRIPS is that,
due to a multitude of external factors including "lack of political will"
demonstrated by the governments of developing countries and deep-
seated socio-economic issues,143 the access to medicine remains impeded
and stalled. In addition, the fact that such exceptions are limited to
situations of national emergency certainly excludes a number of drugs
that may not rise to the level of emergency but are likely needed and
cannot be afforded by developing countries under the current system.
IV. RECOMMENDATIONS
A. Expand Targeted Donation Programs
Given the current state of crisis, the question of how to improve
access to medicines remains. This Note poses that targeted drug
donation programs should be expanded and promoted to fill the gap of
nonemergency, but nevertheless vital, medicines that developing
countries find difficult to obtain given increased patent protection under
TRIPS. Although general concerns of sustainability and scale remain
valid and prevent donations from being the sole, long-term solution to
the problem, given the relative success of such programs,144 they are
certainly a valid alternative.
Unfortunately, current donation initiatives remain limited to large,
multinational corporations for a number reasons, including the lack of
economies of scale and diminished social incentives for smaller, lesser-
known efforts. To harness all the available power of donations, the
140. WTO General Council, Implementation of Paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration on
the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health, WTIL/540 (Aug. 30, 2003).
141. Mercurio, supra note 78, at 8.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 24.
144. See supra Part II.
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international community should make a concerted effort to strike a fair
balance between objective evaluation and fair criticism about donation
programs and blatant, often unsubstantiated blame, which overall
increases the risk for companies to donate if they are likely to face
public scrutiny and reproach. Current misconceptions about donation
programs in general and overall distrust toward the corporate world's
philanthropic efforts act as a buffer, preventing a needed healthy
discourse about the realities of business decisions and the needs of
developing countries.
On that note, the idea of an independent international organization
vested with the task of coordinating international drug relief efforts
might be a sound solution to current criticism about transparency. An
entity that can perhaps be emulated in structure and function is the
United States Agency for International Development (USAID).145
USAID currently regulates a broad array of initiatives, including U.S.
government-sponsored food relief efforts, emergency food assistance,
and long-term development programs.146 It also lists "global health" as
one of its programs,'47 which is primarily focused on investments in
maternal and neonatal health.
Considering that USAID is an established entity with a long history
of regulating relief efforts, it might be worth expanding its initiatives to
include monitoring of drug donations, or, at the very least, it should be
used as a resource for the international community to imitate its
structure and establish a similar entity to regulate international drug
relief efforts. If better care is taken to monitor and record the figures
surrounding donations, including total tax deductions obtained, perhaps
the international community can move away from bickering about the
nobility of corporate intentions and focus on the benefits donations can
offer.
B. Use a Voucher System in Conjunction with Tax Deductions
An additional solution to concerns that tax deductions for
pharmaceutical donations are costly to the taxpayers is offering an
alternative financial incentive, 48 which would be beneficial to
145. See generally U.S. AGENCY FOR INT'L DEv., http://www.usaid.gov (last updated
Sept. 30, 2013).
146. See Who We Are, U.S. AGENCY FOR INT'L DEV., http://www.usaid.gov/who-we-are
(last updated June 12, 2013).
147. Global Health, U.S. AGENCY FOR INT'L DEV., http://www.usaid.gov/what-we-do/glob
al-health (last updated Nov. 7, 2013).
148. See generally Guilloux & Moon, supra note 1 (using various models to calculate the
cost of drug donations to U.S. taxpayers).
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pharmaceutical companies in light of the current industry environment.
One possible supplement to tax deductions is the use of a "priority
review voucher," 49 as proposed by David B. Ridley et al. 50 The voucher
would allow drug companies to obtain a speedier, priority review status
when waiting in line to have a drug approved by the FDA.1"' Although
the voucher system was originally proposed as an incentive to encourage
the research and development for neglected diseases,152 it appears
transferrable to drug donations and offers a number of useful benefits
that address some of the issues previously discussed.
The voucher would allow manufacturers to bring a high-value drug
of their choice on the market faster, which would likely increase returns
exponentially, especially for successful, blockbuster drugs.153 The
voucher can be a great incentive for companies to increase donation
efforts, and it might eliminate the tax deduction if companies choose to
seek a voucher instead of a deduction. A priority review voucher would
"not entail lower standards for safety and efficacy,"154 although it might
require the FDA to expand additional resources to handle the voucher
applications, which have been estimated at 1 million dollars." 55 To
compensate for that, the FDA may require drug companies to pay a so
called "user fee" in full,156 or the fee could be governmentally subsidized
depending on the extent and nature of the donation. By requiring
manufacturers to pay the user fee, taxpayers' dollars would be saved in
cases where companies opt for the voucher instead of the tax deduction.
Considering that tax deductions are difficult to estimate, it is hard to
tell what the exact savings to taxpayers will be, but, in any event,
careful planning is needed to prevent abuse of the voucher system.157
Given the limited amount of vouchers that can be made available
without backlogging the FDA system, the incentive must be tied to very
149. David B. Ridley, Henry G. Grabowski & Jeffrey L. Moe, Developing Drugs for
Developing Countries, 25 HEALTH AFF. 313, 313 (2006).
150. Id.
151. Seeid.
152. Id.
153. See id. at 315 (estimating that priority review vouchers would be worth more than
$300 million for potential blockbuster drugs, because they would shorten the time the
FDA takes to approve them and therefore allow companies to get drugs to the market
sooner).
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Considering the highly competitive nature of the drug industry, one can imagine
that getting in front of the FDA line for approval carries a lot of value for pharmaceutical
companies facing patent expiration dates and generic competition. Consequently, it must
be ensured that companies would not simply produce unnecessary drugs and promise to
donate them in exchange for getting a bite of a priority review voucher.
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specific and highly regulated eligibility requirements regarding the
quality and type of drug donations qualified for the voucher. For
example, companies might be required to comply with WHO's
recommended guidelines or required to make a time commitment to a
particular donation program.
As far as the interchangeability of tax deductions and review
vouchers, the two systems must be complimentary because, depending
on the established guidelines to qualify for priority review, most
donation programs might be excluded due to scale or other reasons.
Therefore, both incentives are needed to encourage drug companies to
donate without disadvantaging themselves. Overall, the feasibility of
using a voucher system would depend on additional analysis of how the
system can be balanced to incentivize without unduly disrupting the
current market, but it appears to offer a number of benefits that might
promote drug donations.
CONCLUSION
In an era of increased technological and scientific advances, it
appears incumbent upon all of society to take action and not stay idle in
the face of great human suffering. Although imperfect, drug donation
programs are capable of at least partially bridging the existing access to
medicine gap. Therefore, the international community should pay more
attention to what drives drug donations to better understand how they
can be effectively promoted and maximized to their full potential. In
addition, the issues related to balancing patent rights and the needs of
developing countries under TRIPS can only be resolved through
"persistent action, in the framework of consistent international
cooperation . . . for the vicious circle of disease and poverty to be
broken."158 With that in mind, less finger pointing and enhanced
knowledge about the extent of drug donations is likely to result in a
much more productive dialogue than currently exits.
158. Jos6 Luis Valverde, Toward a Global Legal Statute for Medicinal Products, in 9
KEY ISSUES IN PHARMACEUTICALS LAW 273, 277 (Jos6 Luis Valverde ed., 2007).
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